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Introduction
The aim of temporal logic is the analysis of arguments about events and processes in time. To achieve this aim, truth-functional logic is enriched by certain tense operators, among them:
Pp p was the case (at least once) Fp p will be the case (at least once) S (p, q) there has been an occasion when p was the case, ever since which q has been the case U (p, q) there is going to be an occasion when p will be the case, up until which q is going to be the case.
Which sentences involving tense operators express valid principles of reasoning? That turns out to depend on what is assumed about the structure of time. Consider, for instance, this example:
If p is sometime going to be the case, but not until q has previously been the case, and q hasn't yet been the case, then q is sometime going to be the case."
If it is assumed (as it will be throughout this paper) that the earlier/later relation linearly orders the instants of time, then the above example counts as valid; but not, in general, otherwise. There are even examples (see the survey [3] ) whose validity depends on what additional assumptions (density? discreteness? etc.) are made about the temporal order: Each important class of linear orders gives rise to its own temporal theory.
The application of temporal logic to reasoning about the execution of programs has been suggested by several computer science theorists; see for instance [5] , where it is shown that the tense operator U above is just what is needed to express such properties of programs as responsiveness and fair scheduling. (A related development is so-called dynamic logic, surveyed in [ 13 ] .) In this connection, two models of time are especially important: likening the flow of time to the integers in their natural order is appropriate when reasoning about basic features of the sequential functioning of a digital machine, and likening time to the real numbers is appropriate to the continuous workings of an analog device (and to certain special features of the digital case, e.g., asynchronous parallel processing).
Our concern in this paper will be with the decidability of the temporal theories of various classes of linear orders. It turns out that decidability for such theories can often be immediately derived from results in so-called monadic logic. For instance, we get the decidability of the temporal theory of arbitrary linear orders (and of every elementary class of linear orders) from a result of Gurevich [6] . For the integral order, we get decidability from a result of Buchi [2] . (The methods of [6] are model-theoretic, those of [2] are automata-theoretic.) The results of [6] and [2] are unified and extended by a powerful result of Rabin [14] , which gives us decidability for some new cases, e.g., we//-orders. (The original proof in [14] is automata-theoretic; a modeltheoretic alternative proof is given in [ 16] .) A case not covered by [14] is that of complete orders, which (along with elementary classes of complete orders) is covered by Gurevich [7] (where the methods are again model-theoretic, following [12] ).
The main result of this paper is the decidability of the temporal theory of the real order. In Section 1 a detailed proof is given, involving an indirect reduction to the main result of [14] . In Section 2 an alternative proof, by the method of [7] , is outlined. In Section 1 it is also shown that whenever a sentence of temporal logic fails to be valid for the real order, then there is a counterexample to validity which is fairly simple topologically speaking (viz., Borel). In Section 2 it is also shown that the temporal theory of the real order differs from that of arbitrary continuous (unbounded, dense, complete) orders. 1 
Decidability and Borel counterexamples

Syntax
The set L of (well-formed) sentences of temporal logic is defined inductively:
The atoms p Qy p lf p 2 ,. . . are sentences If 0, φ are sentences, then so are ~0, (φ Λ, φ), S(φ, φ), U(φ, φ).
In terms of negation (~) and conjunction (Λ) we can in the usual way define disjunction (v), conditional (-*), biconditional («-•), constant truth (t). In terms of 'since' (S) and 'until' (U) we can define 'was' (P), 'will' (F), 'some-times' (0), and 'always' (D); thus:
Pφ abbreviates 5(0, t) Fφ abbreviates U(φ, t) 00 abbreviates Pp v p v Fp D0 abbreviates ~O~0.
Semantics
Let £ = (Γ, <^) be a linear order. A valuation in ϊ is a function assigning each atom pi a subset of T. Intuitively, think of T as the set of instants of time, < τ as the earlier/later relation, and V{p t ) as the set of times when Pi is true. V can be extended to a function (by abuse of language still called V) defined on all sentences thus:
Our definitions then tell us:
We read "t e F(0)" as "0 is true at t in % under F". We say that φ is satisfίable (respectively, valid) in % under V if it is true at some (respectively, every) t e T. We say that φ is satisfiable (respectively, valid) in % if it is so under some (respectively, every) valuation V in %. We say that φ is satisfiable (respectively, valid) in a class $ of linear orders if it is so in some (respectively, every) % e ®.
The set of sentences of L valid in $ is called the temporal theory of $. Z, Q, R will denote the sets of integers, rationals, and reals with their natural order; superscripts ( + ,~) will denote restriction to positive or negative elements. In this notation our promised result is:
Theorem
The temporal theory of R is decidable.
We will offer two proofs, one in this section and one in the next, for this, our main result. The method of the first proof will be familiar to specialists from other applications. We show that: (1) a formula satisfiable in R is satisfiable in Q under a "nice" valuation; (2) a formula satisfiable in Q under a "nice" valuation is satisfiable in R; (3) the set of formulas satisfiable in Q under "nice" valuations is decidable. (1) is easy; (3) is easy given the main result of [14] ; and (2) is proved by showing that a "nice" valuation in Q satisfying a formula φ can be extended to a valuation in R satisfying φ. (Our rather complicated definition of "niceness" is just what is needed to make this extension lemma hold.) Unfortunately, the proof of this extension lemma, which is quite easy for P, F-temporal logic, becomes more difficult for S, ^-temporal logic.
Definitions
L n is the set of φ e L containing no atoms pi with / > n. 
Pi ^Pί S{pi,pj) '~S(pi,p f ) U(pi,pj) ~U(pi,pj).
A sentence of the second species is one having one of the four forms:
A special sentence is one of form Φ # where Φ is a finite set of sentences of the second species.
Reduction
Our definitions tell us:
Hence φ is valid iff ~0 is not satisfiable iff 0^0 is not satisfiable iff DO~0 is not satisfiable; and to prove Theorem Unpacking our definitions, a little thought shows that satisfiability for D0 is equivalent to satisfiability for Φ # ; thus to prove Theorem 1.3 it suffices to provide a decision procedure for satisfiability in R of special sentences. The remainder of this section will be devoted to that task. We need some technical notions.
Definitions
Recall that an open subset of R is one that can be written as a countable union of open intervals ]u, υ[ = \t\ u<t <υ\. Intervals maximal with respect to the property of being contained in a given open set U are called its components. The interior of a set A is the largest open set contained in it. A set is closed if its complement is open, and is F σ if it can be written as a countable union of closed sets. For basic information about such topological notions we refer the reader to [11] .
It is easy to define a primitive recursive function / such that/Oi) properly bounds the number of subsets of L n+Ϊ consisting of formulas of the first and second species. We call a subset of R n-rudimentary if it is a union of no more than f(n) sets each of which is a difference of two F σ sets. A valuation V in R is n-rudimentary if V(pj) is always an π-rudimentary set. A sentence 0 is rudimentarily satisfiable if it is satisfiable in R under an 7V(0)-rudimentary valuation.
Recall that a linear order 2 = (Γ, <^) is (Dedekind) complete if the following inf and sup axioms hold in it:
Though Q, unlike R, is incomplete, a valuation V in Q will be called φ-complete if these axioms hold for X C Q of either of the forms:
where c may be any element of Q, φ any element of F = first-species sentences that are subformulas of φ or negations of such.
Let φ e F have form p t or ~p t . Note that if V is a 0-complete valuation in Q, then the following conditions are equivalent for any irrational γ e R -Q.
If they hold we say F imposes φ on 7.
Let φ e F have form S(pi,pj). We say F imposes φ or imposes ~ψ on 7 according as the following condition holds or not:
For φ e F of form ί/(p z , p ; ) or ~U(p iy pj) the definition of imposition is similar. Let 7(0, F, 7) denote the set of all φ e F imposed on 7 by F.
F is called φ-good if it is φ-complete and for each 7 e R -Q the set Φ U 7(0, F, 7) is truth-functionally consistent, φ is well-satisfiable if it is satisfiable in Q under a 0-good valuation.
We may suppose we have fixed in advance a method of associating to any finite truth-functionally consistent set K of sentences of the first and second species a maximal truth-functionally consistent extension K*. Let ΛΓ* denote the set of atoms that both appear in K and belong to K*. The association can be so arranged that K* will be, in an appropriate sense, a primitive recursive function of A\ If F is a 0-good valuation in Q, we define its canonical extension to a valuation W in R by setting:
To clarify these definitions we note the following: Suppose that φ is satisfied in Q under the 0-complete valuation F. Suppose that Φ implies p <-y S(q, r) and that F imposes p on 7. Then (1) above will hold for φ = S(q, r), but in general this does not imply that F will impose φ on 7 according to definition (3) above; that only follows if we assume in addition that V is 0-good. Suppose that Φ implies s <-> (t v ύ) and that F imposes s on 7. Then even if we assume that F is 0-good this in general does not imply that F will impose either t or u on 7. However, our definition of the canonical extension W guarantees that we will have either 7 e W(t) or 7 e W(u).
Lemma
The
canonical extension of a φ-good valuation V in Q is an N(φ)-rudimentary valuation W in R.
Proof: With notation as above, conditions (l)-(3) each have the form "3x e Q\/y e Q . . ." and hence by techniques used repeatedly in [11] define F σ sets. Hence for each pertinent K, the set {7 e R -Q: 7(0, F, 7) = K\ is (the restriction to the irrationals of) a finite intersection of sets each of which is an F σ or the complement of one. This makes it a difference of two F σ sets. Now W(pi) has the form:
(the union being over those K with p z e K*). V(pj), like any countable set, is an F σ . The number of pertinent K is properly bounded by /(«), where n = Λf(0). Hence W{p{) is ^-rudimentary, as required.
Lemma
Let 
Claim If ]α,γ[ C W(φ), then there exist α, c e Q with ]α,7[ C ]a,c[ CW(φ).
Let now V be the restriction of W to Q. We must prove: (a) that V is φ-complete, (b) that V is φ-good, (c) that φ is satisfied in Q under V. Now (a) is more or less immediate from Claim 1.10. As for (b) and (c), it will suffice to establish:
Claim
If φ e F and γeR-Q and V imposes φ on 7, then 7 e W(φ).
Claim If φ e F and c e Q and c e W(φ), then c e V(φ).
As they are similar we treat only the former. Even it is more or less immediate from Claim 1.9, except for the case of φ of form ~S{pj,pk) (or, similarly, U(pj,pk)). In this case we attack the contrapositive, assuming that 7 e H>(S(p/,p*)),thatis:
in order to prove that V imposes S(pj, pjc) on 7, that is:
Fixing a as in (4) and assuming it to be irrational, Claim 1.10 gives us a rational a 0 < a with ]a o ,y[ C W{p k ). Fixing a x e d with a < a x < 7, since ue ]ciQ,a 1 [ Π W(pj), Claim 1.9 gives us a rational a belonging to the same set. This will do for (5).
Lemma
Let φ be a special formula. If φ is satisfiable in Q under a φ-good valuation V, then φ is satisfiable in R under the canonical extension WofV.
Proof: Assume the hypotheses of the lemma. Let φ = Φ # , N(φ) = n. What we must show is that if y e R and θ is a conjunct of p n Λ ΛΦ, then y e W(θ). We treat the case where 7 is irrational, the rational case being similar. Let / = (Φ U 7(0, V, 7)) + . The facts needed from the construction are summed up by: (6) θeJ (7) φ e J whenever V imposes ψ on 7 (8) Pi eJ iff yeW(pi) (9) ~σeJiffσ4J (10) (σ Λ r) e / iff σ e / and τ e /.
(Here (9) and (10) hold for all formulas by maximal truth-functional consistency.) Using (6)- (10) 
)).
This says that (5) above implies (4) above. And indeed the a of (5) can serve as the a of (4). To see this, just note that if a < β < 7, then by (5) (and definition (1)) V imposes p^ on |3, whence, by (7) and (8), β e W(p k ).
Claim If V imposes ~S(pj, p^) on 7, then 7 e W(~S(p/, p^)).
The antecedent and consequent respectively say:
Vα(α < 7 Λ α e H/( P/ ) -> 3j3(o: < β < 7 Λ β ^ H/(p^))).
In case V does ^oί impose ~pj on 7, then given o: for which the antecedent of (12) holds, definition (1) provides anαeQ with a < a < 7 and a e V(pj). Then (11) provides a b which can serve as the β of (12).
In case V does impose ~p ; on 7, then taking a as in definition (1) and applying (11) to obtain a b, we have:
This in effect says that K imposes S(^p k , ~Pj) on 7 and, arguing as in the proof of Claim 1.14, we see that 7
e W(S(~~p k , ~p f ) and 7 ^ W(S(p;, p k ))).
Lemmas 1.7, 1.8, and 1.13 above show that for special sentences satisfiability in R, well-satisfiability, and rudimentary-satisfiability coincide. We will see in the next section that decidability for well-satisfiability and equally for rudimentary satisfiability follows directly from the main theorem of [14] , thus completing the proof of Theorem 1.3. Let us make explicit a bonus implicit in this proof: A Borel set is one obtainable from open sets by iterated application of complementation and countable union, e.g., rudimentary sets are Borel. Borel-satisfiability is satisfiability in R under a valuation V for which V(pi) is always Borel. We have:
Corollary
Any sentence of temporal logic satisfiable in R is Borelsatisfiable.
Continuous orders and decidability again 2.1 Universal monadic theories
First-order logic, the logic of the textbooks, allows quantification only over individual elements of the universe of discourse. Quantification over subsets of the universe as well is allowed by monadic logic, a fragment of second-order logic. We follow the terminology and notation (e.g., t= for modeling, f •£j for substitutionj of [ 1 ] , which is recommended for developing intuition about the scope and limits of first-order logic. To illustrate, let JL lst and I mono be respectively the sets of sentences of first-order and of monadic logic involving a single nonlogical symbol, the binary predicate <. Then the usual axioms for linear order (irreflexivity, transitivity, trichotomy) belong to L lst :
as do the axioms for density, discreteness, etc. (which we leave to the reader). By contrast, the axiom for well-ordering only belongs to L mono :
\/X(3x(x eX)^ lx(x e X Λ ~3y(y eX/\y<x))) .
So, too, for the inf and sup axioms for completeness given in the preceding section. A monadic sentence is universal if it consists of zero, one, or more universally quantified set-variables followed by a formula without further bound set-variables. For example, the well-ordering and completeness axioms are. universal. The first-order (respectively, universal monadic) (respectively, (full) monadic) theory of a class ® of linear orders is the set of all first-order (respectively, universal monadic) (respectively, monadic) sentences that hold in all ίefi. To connect this subject with temporal logic we have:
Reduction
To each sentence φ of temporal logic we will associate a formula φ + of monadic logic. If the atoms of φ are p 0 , p l9 . . ., p n , then φ + will have the free individual variable* and free set-variablesX o , X l9 . . ., X n , and no bound set-variables:
Here the variables y, z substituted for x are the alphabetically first ones that have not already been used. To each sentence φ of temporal logic we will associate a universal monadic sentence 0*, namely the universal closure \IXJJXx . . . \/X n \fxφ + of 0 + . Comparison of the semantics for temporal logic (Subsection 1.2 above) with that for first-and higher-order logic (as in [1] ) discloses:
Proposition
Let φ(p 0 , . . ., p n ) be a sentence of temporal logic,
., X n ) and 0* its transforms. Let Z = (T, <γ) be a linear order, Va valuation in Z, a e T, A t = V{p{) C T. Then:
Since the transforms are effective we have:
Corollary
For any class S of linear orders, the decision problem for the temporal theory of $ is reducible to the decision problem for the universal monadic theory of S.
There exists a partial converse to Proposition 2.3 and Corollary 2.4, but unlike them it is no trivial consequence of the definitions. Its complicated original proof [9] has recently been simplified [4] . The main theorem of [14] has as direct corollaries many previously known and many new decidability results; see the survey [ 15 ] . For our purposes, what is most important is:
Theorem
Theorem (M. O. Rabin)
The following are decidable:
(a) The monadic theory of Q (b) The monadic theory of R with set variables restricted to range only over F σ sets.
Some remarks are in order:
(i) The full monadic theory of R is known to be undecidable. Indeed, allowing just one quantification over arbitrary sets of reals produces undecidability even if all other set-quantifiers are restricted to range only over sets of rationals. A new proof of this negative result will be found in [8] , superseding the old proof of [16] , which used the Continuum Hypothesis.
(ii) By the transform method (Proposition 2.3, Corollary 2.4), parts (a) and (b) of Theorem 2.6 yield, respectively, the decidability of the set of wellsatisfiable and rudimentarily satisfiable sentences of temporal logic, as required for Theorem 1.3.
(iii) Theorem 2.6(a) has as immediate corollaries decidability for the monadic theories of Q + , Q", Z, etc. Less immediate corollaries are obtainable by combining Theorem 2.6(a) with Cantor's Theorem (to the effect that any countable linear order is isomorphic to a suborder of Q) and the LowenheimSkolem Theorem (which implies that when a universal monadic sentence fails in a linear order, then it fails in some countable suborder). Some corollaries are summed up in Corollary 2.7 below. As noted there (and in [15] ), many such corollaries were previously known (e.g., from [2] or [6] ). A subclass $' of a class S of linear orders is elementary relative to $ (or when S = all linear orders, simply elementary) if $' is the class of all 2 e $ in which some given first-order sentence holds. For example, the class of dense orders, discrete orders, and of orders with (without) minimum (maximum) elements are elementary.
(iv) Shelah has recently announced the analogue of Theorem 2.6(b) with Borel in place of F σ .
Corollary
The universal monadic theories of the following classes of linear orders are decidable: 
Definitions
A linear order will be called unbounded if it has neither a minimum nor a maximum; continuous if it is unbounded, dense, and complete; and separable if it has a countable dense subset. Any separable continuous order is isomorphic to R. A typical inseparable continuous order is © = (S, <$), the horizontal unit strip in the plane with the lexicographic order:
The following does not follow directly from results in [ 14] :
Theorem
The universal monadic theories of the following classes of complete linear orders are decidable: Let 2U, y, X) be the formula:
(x=y)v (x<y ι\\/z(x <z <y ^(z e X *~+x e X))) v(y<x Λ \/z(y<z<χ-+(z eX+-+xeX))) .
Note that if A C T and we define a =4 b to hold iff 2 t= τ(a, b,A), then =4 is a congruence. Let σ o (X) be the conjunction of:
(1) \fx3y(χφy ι\τ(x,y,X))
Note that if 2 t= σ o [^4], and =4 is as above, then (1) tells us that each =4-congruence class is nondegenerate, (2) tells us that the quotient 2/=4 is nondegenerate, and (3) tells us that that quotient is dense. Let σ UfV (X) be the result of replacing each quantification \/t or 3t in
So p says that σ holds relative to any nonempty open interval.
Proposition
Let % = (Γ, < T ) be a linear order. Then % 1= ~σ iff there exists a congruence = on %such that: 
The following hold for p as well as for σ: 
Proof of Theorem 2.9(a)
We refer the reader to the Appendix of [6] . An n-chain is a structure 21 = {A, <^, P^, . . ., P£) consisting of a linear order with n + 1 designated subsets. To prove the decidability of the universal monadic theory of complete linear orders, it suffices to prove for all n uniformly in n the decidability of the first-order theory of ^-chains. Fix n. [7] is concerned with weak second-order logic (monadic logic with set-variables restricted to range only over finite sets). In Section 14 decidability is proved for: (i) the weak second-order theory of complete linear orders. In Section 15 decidability is deduced for: (ii) the weak second-order theory of completê -chains. This proves Theorem 2.9(a). Actually, the method of (i) applies directly to the first-order theory of complete ^-chains, and can be adapted to separable complete ^-chains.
Proof of Theorem 2.9(c)
We outline this adaptation: Let % = (T, < τ ) be a linear order, (21?: t e T) a family of n-chains 21, = (A t ,< t , Pf) indexed by 2. Its sum is the n-chain 33 = (B, < B , Pf) given by:
When 2 is the two-element order ίO, 1! we simply write 2ί 0 + 211 for the sum. When all % t are the same structure 2t, we write 21 2 for the sum. The family (21,: t e T) and its sum are called %-dense (respectively, an %-shuffling) if 2 is nondegenerate and dense (respectively, 2 = Q) and % is a finite set of ^-chains with:
V21 e %({t e T: 2l f = 2I 1 ! is dense in 2).
We claim any two g-dense sums have the same first-order theory, and any twô -shufflings are isomorphic. The proof uses the back-and-forth method (cf. [7] , Lemma 14.1). Let 9ft be the smallest class of ^-chains containing the degenerate ones and closed under isomorphism and the following conditions:
(1) If 21, 93 e 9ft and 21 has a maximum or 33 has a minimum, then 21 +93 e 9ft (2) If 2ί e 9ft has either a minimum or a maximum, and % = Z + or Z", then a ϊeSW (3) If % C Wl is finite, and each 21 e 9ft has both a minimum and a maximum, and some 2ί e 9ft is degenerate, and 93 is an g-shuffling, then 93 e 9ft.
Let $ 0 be the class of all separable complete ^-chains, ® x the class of all complete ^-chains in which p holds. Write "0( )" for "first-order theory of". Since $ 0 Q $i by Proposition 2.12(a), 0(^0 C 0(t o ). To prove Theorem 2.9(c) it will thus suffice to show:
The proof of (4) uses an analysis of types realized in elements of 9ft, borrowed (like so much of this proof) from [12] (cf. [7] , Theorem 14.2).
To prove (5) it suffices to show that for every 93 e 9ft there exists a93 ; e $ 0 with 0(93) = 0(93'). The proof is inductive like the definition of 9ft (cf. [7] , Lemma 14.2). The key step occurs when 93 is an g-shuffling for some % satisfying the hypotheses of (3) above. As induction hypothesis we assume that to each 21 e % has been associated an 21' e ® 0 with 0(8) = 0(21'). Let %' = {21': 2ί e 51; it contains a degenerate element. Let (2I r : t e R) be an g-dense family indexed by R,33' its sum. Then 33' is complete, and by taking % t to be degenerate except when t e Q we can guarantee that it will be separable. That #(93) = 0(33') is again proved by the back-and-forth method.
To prove (6): Let 0&(S) be the set of sentences in 0($) having no nesting of quantifiers of depth >k. It suffices to prove for all k that for every 2ί e B 1 there exists a 33 e Wl with θ k {%) = 0*©). We claim = is a congruence; in fact, each equivalence class # is a closed interval, and the restriction 21 \a quasi-good and hence good; moreover the quotient (A,<A)/= is nondegenerate and dense (cf. [7] , Proof of Lemma 14.4). Since 21 1= p, any nonempty open interval I in the quotient must contain a degenerate equivalence class. For each such /, quasi-goodness provides a finite %i Cffll such that for each a e I we have 0^(2115) = 0*(5B) for some 33 e g/. Take / for which g 7 has the least possible cardinality. We claim a contradiction can be derived by comparing any ^/-shuffling, which belongs to ffll by (3), with the restriction of 2t to {α:αe/! (again cf. [7] ). This concludes our sketch of the proof. The italicized passages are the main points of difference from [7] . Let us make explicit a bonus result:
Corollary
Let %be a continuous order in which p holds. Then %is a model of the universal monadic theory of R.
Examples
Here are some inseparable continuous orders in which p holds:
The Long Line: This results from the countable ordinals when each point is replaced by a copy of the half-open unit interval [0, 1 [. Suslin Lines: The hypothesis that they exist has the same status as the Continuum Hypothesis; see [10] . NOTE 1. Roughly, the material in Section 1 is due to Burgess, that in Section 2 to Gurevich.
